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SUGGESTED DIVORCE REFORMS FOR ILLINOIS
WILLIAM F. ZACHARIAS*
N the days when absolute divorce was deemed a judicial
impossibility the cry for relief from the chafing bonds
of matrimony was met by the action of the Ecclesiastical
Court of England in granting divorces a mensa et thoro.1
This remedy, or its statutory counterpart, separate main-
tenance, was adopted by the great majority of the United
States where the power in such matters was usually con-
fided to the jurisdiction of the chancellor.2
The introduction of this type of relief into the realm
of American law did not pass without criticism, however,
for as early as 1826 Chancellor Kent wrote:
These qualified divorces are regarded as rather hazardous to
the morals of the parties. In the language of the English courts,
it is throwing the parties back upon society, in the undefined and
dangerous character of a wife without a husband, and a husband
without a wife.3
But apparently, until quite recent times, the state of Flor-
ida was the only American jurisdiction which forbade the
granting of limited divorces.'
At a time when the public policy of the community
frowned on the dissolution of the marital tie, such limited
divorces likely served as a wholesome means to protect
the family and society from the ills which were believed
* Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law;
Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1 See history thereof in 14 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 217.
2 Chester G. Vernier, American Family Laws (Stanford University, Cal.:
Stanford University Press, 1932), Vol. II, pp. 342-3, notes twenty-seven
jurisdictions granting divorce a mensa et thoro, and on p. 471 lists a total of
thirty-nine, including twenty-one of the former category, where statutory
separate maintenance is granted. This list is now subject to modification
by reason of the statutory changes noted hereafter occurring since 1932, the
date of the publication of this volume.
3 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law (12th ed. edited by 0. W.
Holmes, Jr., Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1873), p. 152.
4 Act of Feb. 14, 1835, sec. 3, found in Comp. Gen. Laws of Florida, Vol.
II, second division, Title III, Ch. X, Art. 13, sec. 4982, published by Har-
rison Co., Atlanta, Ga., 1928.
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to flow from absolute divorce. There are indications, how-
ever, that the modern generation has begun to experience
doubts as to whether this and similar cures were not
worse than the ailment, and the tide of legislative and
public expression against such ancient remedies is rising
day by day.5
The proponents of this newer public policy rely on the
contentions that, first, limited divorce prevents remar-
riage of the disappointed spouses who would be far more
likely to find happiness if they were free to select differ-
ent mates, and second, the divorce a mensa et thoro, usu-
ally granted on grounds not sufficient to warrant absolute
divorce, is open to perversion into a form of legalized
"blackmail" by a wife6 who, while unwilling to perform
her marital duties, is nevertheless not unwilling to receive
the tribute to her status enforced by such a decree in the
form of a separate maintenance allowance. A husband
thus "mulcted" for the duration of the marital status
might well feel that the law has given sanction to what,
in common parlance, is called "gold-digging."
It is not purposed to discuss the correctness of these
claims, nor to examine whether they rest on a valid foun-
dation, but rather to see what action has been taken in
response to these demands. The investigation becomes
more pointed since the decision of the Illinois Supreme
5 Vernier, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 349. Stallings v. Stallings, 177 La. 488, 148
So. 687 (1933), in which Rogers, J., comments that the Louisiana statute
"was enacted solely for the benefit of the party against whom a judgment of
separation from bed and board is rendered, because under the pre-existing
law, it was found that persons obtaining such judgments sometimes chose,
from religious scruples or otherwise, to rest at that point, refrain from obtain-
ing judgments of final divorce, and thus hold the defendants, with whom,
perhaps, they were unwilling to become reconciled, in the position of being
neither married nor capable of legally marrying, a position which was not
regarded as conducive to good morals or the general welfare." See also files
of Chicago Tribune under dates of Jan. 3, 1937; Jan. 6, 1937; Jan. 27, 1937;
and March 10, 1937.
6 In some states the right to secure such divorces is confined solely to the
wife. In the others, although the decree may be awarded to either spouse,
the records would probably disclose that the successful petitioner is usually
the wife. See Vernier, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 343, and Ill. State Bar Stats.
(1935), Ch. 68, 22.
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Court in the case of DeMotte v. DeMotte7 declaring the
recently enacted amendment to the Husband and Wife
Act" to be unconstitutional, because if the newer public
policy is as strong as its proponents claim, some other
expression thereof will be emanating from the Illinois
legislature in the near future.'
The laws thus far enacted affecting limited divorce may
be classified roughly into three groups: first, those abol-
ishing the remedy or forbidding its use ;1o second, those
which permit the remedy but expressly limit the length of
its duration;" and third, those statutes which, while mak-
ing no reference to limited divorce, impliedly or by judi-
cial interpretation have been considered as restricting the
duration of limited divorces through provisions therein
7 364 Ill. 421, 4 N.E. (2d) 960 (1936). See criticism thereof in 4 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 338.
8 I1. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 68, 22, which is sec. 1 of "An Act in
relation to married men and women" as amended in 1935.
9 Chicago Sunday Tribune, Jan. 3, 1937, part I, p. 13, devotes one-half
page to a criticism of existing laws affecting the marital relationship.
10 Florida, Comp. Gen. Laws 1927, Vol. II, second division, Title III, Ch.
X, art. 13, sec. 4982, reads: "No divorce shall be from bed and board, but
every divorce shall be from bonds of matrimony." West Virginia, Acts of
1935, Ch. 35, sec. 20, pp. 164-5, provides in substance that all existing decrees
a mensa et thoro may be revoked on joint application, or either party may
proceed to have the same made final, and that all pending suits for limited
divorce shall be converted forthwith into suits for absolute divorce or with-
drawn.
11 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Civil Code, Ch. 22, sec. 966 (as amended by 74th
Congress, First session, Public Act No. 252, effective Aug. 7, 1935) provides
for conversion of separate maintenance decree into absolute divorce two years
after its rendition. LOUISIANA, Gen. Stat. 1932, Vol. I, Ch. 4, sec. 2209, per-
mits conversion of the limited divorce by the successful party at the end of
one year, and if not so done, the other party may apply for the same sixty
days thereafter. MINNESOTA, Gen. Laws 1935, Ch. 295, sec. 1, amends Ma-
son's Minn. Stat. 1927, sec. 8585, by authorizing a separate suit for absolute
divorce five years after decree for limited divorce. NORTH DAXKOTA, Laws of
1933, Ch. 105, sec. 5, p. 157, directs revocation of the limited divorce four
years after rendition "if it shall be made to appear . . . that reconciliation
between the parties is improbable." VIRGINIA, Michie's Code 1930, sec. 5115,
permits spouse securing the limited divorce to convert the same into absolute
divorce at expiration of three years where no reconciliation has taken place,
and either party may so request after five years. If the limited divorce was
granted for desertion, the five-year period is measured from the date of the
separation and not the decree. WIscoNsIN, Gen. Stats. 1935, Ch. 247.07 p.
2270, makes the act of living apart for five years or more, pursuant to a decree
for divorce from bed and board, without request for reconciliation, ground for
absolute divorce, but requires that six months of the period be subsequent to
effective date of act.
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allowing an absolute divorce where the parties have not
cohabited for the statutory period.' These statutes differ
in context, but all are based on the proposition that where
a husband and wife have lived apart for a period of time,
without any intention ever to resume conjugal relations,
the best interests of society and the parties themselves
will be promoted by a dissolution of the marital bond.
These statutes, however, have not been free from prob-
lems of interpretation and have given rise to difficulties
on five major issues: first, whether fault should be con-
sidered in determining who might sue for the divorce;
second, whether alimony should be granted in the event
of dissolution of the marriage; third, whether the separa-
tion should be voluntary; fourth, whether the separation
should be total and absolute; and fifth, whether the stat-
ute should be construed only as prospective in nature.
The courts obliged to solve these difficulties have gener-
ally responded with liberal answers and have granted
absolute divorces without regard to the fault of the peti-
tioner in causing the separation, " except, perhaps, in
12 Acts in this class provide, in addition to absolute divorce on the ground
of willful desertion, for a new ground for divorce arising from lack of co-
habitation for the statutory period. See ARIZONA, Session Laws 1931, Ch.
12 (five years) ; KENTUCKY, Acts of General Assembly 1936, Ch. 25, p. 63,
approved Feb. 18, 1936 (five years) ; NEVADA, Laws of 1931, Ch. 111, p. 180
(five years); NORTH CAROLINA, Public Laws 1933, Ch. 163, p. 143 (two
years) ; RHODE ISLAND, Gen. Laws 1923, Ch. 291, sec. 3 (ten years) ; TEXAS,
Vernon's Anno. Rev. Civil Stats. 1925, Vol. 13, Title 75, Ch. 4, art. 4629 (ten
years) ; WASHINGTON, Remington Rev. Stat. Anno. 1931, Title 6, Ch. 12, sec.
982 (five years).
'3 Schuster v. Schuster, 42 Ariz. 190, 23 P. (2d) 559 (1933) ; Hale v. Hale,
137 Ky. 831, 127 S. W. 475 (1910); Brown v. Brown, 172 Ky. 754, 189
S.W. 921 (1916) ; Ward v. Ward, 213 Ky. 606, 281 S.W. 801 (1926) ; Best v.
Best, 218 Ky. 648, 291 S.W. 1032 (1927) ; Clark v. Clark, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 955,
53 S.W. 644 (1899) ; Parker v. Parker, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1228, 104 S.W. 1028
(1907); Raymond v. Carrano, 112 La. 869, 36 So. 787 (1904); Hava v.
Chavigny, 143 La. 365, 78 So. 594 (1918) ; Goudeau v. Goudeau, 146 La. 742,
84 So. 39 (1920) ; North v. North, 164 La. 293, 113 So. 852 (1927) ; Cooke v.
Cooke, 164 N. C. 272, 80 S.E. 178 (1913) ; Long v. Long, 206 N. C. 706, 175
S.E. 85 (1934) ; Campbell v. Campbell, 207 N. C. 125, 176 S.E. 250 (1934) ;
Guillot v. Guillot, 42 R. I. 230, 106 A. 801 (1919); McKenna v. McKenna,
53 R. I. 373, 166 A. 822 (1933) ; Smith v. Smith, 54 R. I. 236, 172 A. 323
(1934). Later cases from North Carolina have narrowed the cause for
divorce to apply only where the separation for the' statutory period has been
"mutual" under an express or implied separation agreement; hence fault
may now bar the petition. The statute reads, in part, that "when there has
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those cases where the statute expressly restricts the rem-
edy to the innocent person,' 4 or has been interpreted so
to mean by the courts of the state.'" Decrees thus
granted, however, usually recognize the right of the inno-
cent person to claim alimony in place of the allowance
provided by the prior limited divorce" so that the puni-
tive effect of the decree is still preserved as a deterrent
to marital misconduct.
In only two instances do such statutes expressly char-
acterize the kind of separation essential to secure such
an absolute divorce by describing it as "voluntary,
17
but the courts of several states have held that this is a
requisite so that no divorce would be granted where the
separation was induced by the incarceration of one spouse
in an institution for the insane," though a distinction has
been a separation of husband and wife, either under deed of separation or
otherwise . . ." the marriage may be dissolved. Michie's North Carolina
Code 1931, sec. 1659 (a). The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, has
seemingly disregarded the use of the phrase "or otherwise." See Parker v.
Parker, 210 N. C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 210 N. C.
554, 187 S. E. 768 (1936) ; and Hyder v. Hyder, 210 N. C. 486, 187 S. E. 798
(1936).
14 Louisiana, Gen. Stats. 1932, Vol. I, Ch. 4, sec. 2209, gives the innocent
spouse a preference in making the application.
15 Pierce v. Pierce, 120 Wash. 411, 208 P. 49, 51 A. L. R. 767 (1922)
McGarry v. McGarry, 181 Wash. 689, 44 P. (2d) 816 (1935). But see Evans
v. Evans, 182 Wash. 297, 46 P. (2d) 730 (1935), where the court appears to
have granted a divorce on the statutory cause without deciding whether de-
fendant was at fault in causing the separation. Jakubke v. Jakubke, 125 Wis.
635, 104 N.W. 704 (1905) ; Krause v. Krause, 177 Wis. 165, 187 N. W. 1019
(1922) ; Rooney v. Rooney, 186 Wis. 49, 202 N.W. 143 (1925).
16 Lacey v. Lacey, 95 Ky. 110, 23 S. W. 673 (1893) ; Newsome v. New-
some, 95 Ky. 383, 25 S. W. 878 (1894) ; Irwin v. Irwin, 105 Ky. 632, 49 S. W.
432 (1899) ; Hale v. Hale. 137 Ky. 831, 127 S. W. 475 (1910); Howell v.
Howell, 206 N. C. 672, 174 S. E. 921 (1934) ; State v. Henderson, 207 N. C.
258, 176 S. E. 758 (1934) ; Cole v. Cole, 27 Wis. 531 (1869).
17 Wisconsin, Gen. Stats. 1935, Ch. 247.07, p. 2270, recites: "(7) whenever
the husband and wife shall have voluntarily lived entirely separate and apart
.... " See also Thompson v. Thompson, 53 Wis. 153, 10 N.W. 531 (1881);
Krause v. Krause, 177 Wis. 165, 187 N. W. 1019 (1922) ; Sanders v. Sanders.
135 Wis. 613, 116 N. W. 176 (1908) ; Williams v. Williams, 122 Wis. 27, 99
N. W. 431 (1904). Texas, Vernon's Anno. Rev. Civil Stats. 1925, Vol. 13,
Title 75, Ch. 4, art. 4629, commences: "Except where the husband or wife is
insane, a divorce may be decreed .. "
18 Ferguson v. Ferguson, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 428 (1886) ; Pile v. Pile, 94 Ky.
308, 22 S. W. 215 (1893) : Messick v. Messick. 177 Ky. 337, 197 S. W. 792
(1917) ; Lee v. Lee, 182 N. C. 61, 108 S. E. 352 (1921) ; Camire v. Camire,
43 R. 1. 489,113 A. 748 (1921).
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been drawn where the insanity arose after the statutory
period had run.'9 The same principle has been applied in
the case of imprisonment for crime in a jurisdiction where
imprisonment for felony was not, itself, a cause for abso-
lute divorce,2 ° though there is also authority that this fact
should not affect the right to divorce inasmuch as the
defendant's own fault caused the involuntary separa-
tion.21
The statutes are unanimous, however, in requiring that
the separation be total and absolute, so that a mere re-
fusal to perform one or some of the marital duties would
not be sufficient,22 but if there is an absolute and clear
break in the matrimonial cohabitation, it does not seem to
matter whether the parties live in the same building there-
after or not.23 Furthermore, these statutes either ex-
pressly or by interpretation, have been held to apply ret-
roactively to separations or limited divorces existing at
the time of and prior to the effective date of the several
acts so as to permit immediate redress in those cases
which have given rise to the present clamor for relief.24
It will be remembered that by the unconstitutional en-
actment in 193525 the Illinois legislature attempted to in-
troduce into the law most of these same ideas for this
state but with one innovation: that of drawing a distinc-
19 Andrews v. Andrews' Committee, 120 Ky. 718, 87 S.W. 1080 (1905),
rehearing denied 120 Ky. 723, 90 S. W. 581 (1906).
20 Sitterson v. Sitterson, 191 N. C. 319, 131 S. E. 641 (1926).
21 Davis v. Davis, 102 Ky. 440, 43 S. W. 168 (1897).
22 Gates v. Gates, 192 Ky. 253, 232 S. W. 378 (1921) ; Arnoult v. Letten,
155 La. 275, 99 So. 218 (1924) ; Quinn v. Brown, 159 La. 570, 105 So. 624
(1925).
23 Stewart v. Stewart, 45 R. I. 375, 122 A. 778 (1923), holding that where
wife occupied one apartment in building owned by. husband and he occupied
another for statutory period the parties had "lived apart" as contemplated by
the legislature, but see also cases cited in note 22.
24 Schuster v. Schuster, 42 Ariz. 190, 23 P. (2d) 559 (1933) ; Tipping v.
Tipping, 82 F. (2d) 828 (1936) ; Hurry v. Hurry, 141 La. 954, 76 So. 160
(1917), reaffirmed in 144 La. 877, 81 So. 378 (1918) ; Hava v. Chavigny, 143
La. 365, 78 So. 594 (1918) ; Stallings v. Stallings, 177 La. 488, 148 So. 687
(1933) Gerdts v. Gerdts, 196 Minn. 599, 265 N. W. 811 (1936) ; Cole v.
Cole, 27 Wis. 531 (1869). For cases supporting the contrary view see dis-
senting opinion by Stephens, J., in Tipping v. Tipping, 82 F. (2d) 828, on p.
831 (1936).
25 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 68, 1 22.
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tion between cases where the marriage had proved fruit-
ful and those from which no issue had sprung, or if any
had been born, were not living at the time of the suit.
The majority opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court de-
claring the act unconstitutiona 2 6 neglected to consider
whether such classification was reasonable or not. With-
out any further examination of this point, it is inter-
esting to note that none of the statutes under considera-
tion attempts any such classification. The first statute of
North Carolina enacted in 193127 was so worded as to
apply only in cases where no children had been born to
the spouses, but this provision was deleted in 1933; so
the present statute of that state applies to all married
persons. 2
In the light of these other statutes and the problems
that have arisen under them, a proposal now pending
before the current session of the Illinois legislature is
entitled to more than passing reference. This proposal,
designed to strike at the alleged evils of limited divorce,
defers to the criticism made by the court in the DeMotte
case29 of the earlier attempt to refashion the Illinois
divorce laws and purports to amend the Illinois Divorce
Act 0 by adding a tenth ground for absolute divorce. As
offered, the text reads:
(b) Either party to the said marriage shall be entitled to obtain
a divorce and dissolution of such marriage contract regardless of
any question of injury, fault, misconduct, or culpability if it shall
be adjudged, in the manner in this Act provided, that the parties
to the said marriage have been living separate and apart without
cohabitation with each other for a period of two years consecu-
tively, immediately before the filing of a complaint for divorce
hereunder, and shall then so be living separate and apart, whether
such period of living separate and apart shall have commenced
before or after the enactment hereof, and regardless of whether
or not there shall theretofore have been entered an order for tem-
26 DeMotte v. DeMotte, 364 I1. 421, 4 N. E. (2d) 960 (1936).
27 Laws of 1931, Ch. 72, and Michie's No. Car. Code, 1931, sec. 1659 (a).
28 North Carolina, Public Laws 1933, Ch. 163, p. 143.
29 364 Ill. 421, 4 N. E. (2d) 960 (1936).
30 Ill. State Bar Stats. 1935, Ch. 40.
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porary alimony or a decree for support and maintenance, and
regardless of whether there shall then be pending or theretofore
shall have been pending any complaint for divorce or support
and maintenance. If an order or decree for maintenance and sup-
port shall have been entered in any proceeding between the
parties to a proceeding for divorce under the provisions of this
paragraph, the provisions of this paragraph shall apply regard-
less of whether such order or decree for maintenance and support
shall have been entered before or after the enactment of this Act.
(c) When a divorce shall be decreed for the cause specified in
paragraph (b) of this Section, the parties thereto shall not there-
by lose dower nor the benefit of any jointure between them unless
the court entering such divorce decree shall find therein that one
of the parties has been guilty of any such fault or misconduct as
would have entitled the other party to a divorce for any cause or
causes specified in paragraph (a) of this Section, and, if the court
so finds, the said court may make such further order touching or
concerning dower rights or any jointure between the parties to
the marriage thereby dissolved as from the nature of the case
shall be fit, reasonable, and just, and declaring the rights of
dower or rights under any jointure shall be forfeited by the per-
son so found guilty of fault or misconduct as aforesaid, regardless
of whether the party guilty of such fault or misconduct shall be
the plaintiff or the defendant, and such rights thereupon shall
be forfeited.31
Analysis of this measure discloses the following: first,
that the proposed new ground for divorce will permit the
granting of the decree at the request of either party and
will thus clarify the ambiguity apparent in the former
amendment ;32 second, that fault shall not be a determi-
native in deciding the issue ;33 third, the separation must
31 Only the pertinent parts of S. B. 179 have been given. The measure,
introduced in the Illinois Senate by Senator R. V. Graham on March 9, 1937,
re-enacts the text of Illinois State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 40, 1 1, as it reads
at present and then adds the two new paragraphs quoted above. Sec. 10 of
the existing act is also amended in the new measure to relieve actions based
on this new cause from the defenses of collusion, etc., referred to therein.
See also on this last point Guillot v. Guillot, 42 R. I. 230, 106 A. 801 (1919).
32 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 68, 22, concluded with the words
that the separation under the limited divorce "shall be, for the purpose of
divorce, regarded as desertion by the husband or wife." See also note on
the DeMotte case in 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 338 (1937).
33 This provision should relieve the Illinois courts of a problem which has
vexed others. See cases cited in note 13.
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be total and complete to justify the decree ;"4 fourth, that,
as in the case of willful desertion, the separation must be
for the entire statutory period or longer, must be con-
secutive and not intermittent, and must be measured
from the time of filing the complaint; fifth, the act is ex-
pressly made retroactive as well as prospective;" sixth,
this cause is not affected by either the prior allowance of
temporary or permanent separate maintenance 6 or by a
pending suit for divorce or separate maintenance; and
seventh, dower and property rights are not affected by a
divorce predicated on this ground unless either party
could have secured an absolute divorce on some other of
the existing nine grounds.8 7
It will be noted that the proposed act does not abolish
separate maintenance as a remedy"8 though a companion
proposal seeks to modify the Illinois Husband and Wife
Act 9 by limiting the recovery of the allowance therein
provided until "the termination of the marriage of the
said parties by any valid decree of divorce from the
bonds of matrimony. . . . "'0 It is, therefore, intended
that this remedy shall continue and may, if both the
parties so elect, be as permanent as it has been hereto-
fore. It is more natural to suppose, though, that such
decrees will probably not outlast the two-year period
required to establish the new cause for absolute divorce,
and will really operate only as a stop-gap to secure tem-
34 See cases cited in notes 22 and 23.
85 Again, the Illinois courts are relieved of the burden of choosing between
two sets of conflicting decisions on this point. See note 24.
36 The former Illinois act made this decree a prerequisite to application
for an absolute divorce. See Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 68, 1 22, and
criticism of this provision in DeMotte v. DeMotte, 364 Il. 421, 4 N. E. (2d)
960 (1936).
37 To justify this action another companion measure, S. B. 180, introduced
by Senator R. V. Graham, on March 9, 1937, seeks to amend the Dower
Act, Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 41. f 14, which at present provides
that the guilty spouse shall lose dower rights in the lands of the innocent
spouse.
8 In this respect it agrees with most of the measures considered except for
the statutes of Florida and West Virginia. See note 10.
39 11. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 68, 22.
40 S. B. 181. introduced in the Illinois Senate by Senator R. V. Graham
on March 9. 1937.
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porary support for the spouse applying therefor during
that time.
The same measure4' also contains a suggestion of
amendment to Section 15 of the Divorce Act 42 relating
to the allowance of temporary alimony during the pend-
ency of a suit for absolute divorce based on this new
cause, which amendment, in effect, provides for allowance
thereof by the court on condition that if any prior order
for support shall have been entered in any proceeding
between the parties and should still be in force and effect,
then such prior order may be stayed or vacated. Pro-
vision is likewise made for the amendment of Section 18
relating to permanent alimony and support money, under
which the court may still grant such allowance but sub-
ject to the condition that only one decree may be oper-
ating between the parties after dissolution of the mar-
riage, and that one only so long as the recipient of such
provision remains unmarried.13
It appears, therefore, that the framers of the new
measure have borne in mind most of the difficulties which
have arisen under the statutes of the other states and
have drafted an act which is explicit on these points.
There is occasion, though, to notice that the act does not
characterize the kind of separation necessary. Use of
the term "voluntary" has not been regarded essential
in the other jurisdictions having similar laws, but, as has
already been noted, the courts have treated these statutes
as having that significance. 4 The expression "volun-
tarily separated" is rather an unfortunate choice since
it does not properly describe the situation where the
parties are living apart under a decree of limited divorce,
in which case, unlike that where a private separation
41 S. B. 179.
42 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 40.
43 S. B. 179. See Howell v. Howell, 206 N. C. 672, 174 S. E. 921
(1934), holding that divorce decree did not terminate obligation to support as
provided in prior limited divorce decree.
44 See cases cited in notes 18-21 inclusive.
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agreement exists, the guilty person is kept away by threat
of contempt of court rather than because of his or her
own desire. The term would undoubtedly be given the
same meaning already judicially applied to divorce for
willful desertion, that is, that a separation pending de-
termination of a suit for selarate maintenance or divorce
is a separation impliedly "with consent," hence "volun-
tary." Statutory recognition of this point would be ad-
visable, though, in order that the rights of an insane
spouse might not be prejudiced by too loose an interpre-
tation of the language found in the proposed measure.
Another criticism could be levelled at that portion of
paragraph (b) reciting that divorce on this new ground
might be granted "regardless of whether there shall then
be pending . . . any complaint for divorce ... ." It is
possible to conceive of the situation where one spouse has
been guilty, for example, of willful desertion, which by
statute in Illinois requires an absence of not less than one
year,45 and a suit instituted by the other based thereon
which suit could easily be still pending one year later, yet
one day later the guilty person could initiate another suit
predicated on the statutory cause proposed and be en-
titled to a decree despite the other's diligence. Except
for the possibility of compelling a merger or consolida-
tion of the two causes, the innocent spouse is thus un-
justly and unnecessarily obliged to appear in two pro-
ceedings.4
45 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 40, 1. It must be remembered that the
proposed measure does not seek to eliminate any of the existing causes for
divorce so that the innocent spouse may still predicate a suit for absolute
divorce on any ground named therein. More complicated still would be the
problem of divorce on the ground of habitual drunkenness which, in Illinois,
must continue for the same period of two years.
46 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, sec. 179 (Civil Practice Act, sec.
51) provides: ". . actions pending in the same court may be consolidated,
as an aid to convenience, whenever it can be done without prejudice to a sub-
stantial right." Sec. 176(d) of the same statute (Civil Practice Act, sec. 48)
permits the use of a motion to dismiss for us pendens only when the other
action pending is based on the same cause. It would seem, therefore, more
appropriate to compel the accused spouse to notice the first suit for trial and
secure a disposition thereof before being permitted to institute the suit on the
new ground. For the use of cross-complaint in such cases see McKenna v.
McKenna, 53 R. 1. 373, 166 A. 822 (1933).
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Except for these minor considerations the measure
seems adequate to meet the first of the demands for relief
made by the proponents, that is, a dissolution of the bonds
of matrimony rather than a perpetuation of the former
state of "holy deadlock" which arose from the old de-
cree of divorce a mensa et thoro. If not subjected to ex-
tensive amendment during passage through the legisla-
ture, this tenth ground should in fairly short order be-
come the leading cause for divorce in this state. With
the existence of such an easy and amicable route open to
release from the tie that "binds," it should outrank even
the facility to a default divorce arising from the mild
interpretation given to the cause described in the statute
as "extreme and repeated cruelty." Lest it prove too
enticing, the legislature might consider whether the pe-
riod of separation should not be increased, for only in
Louisiana is it shorter, and it is generally far longer,
ranging from four years in North Dakota, five years in
Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Washington, to ten years in the states of Rhode Island
and Texas. Two acts, those of the District of Columbia
and North Carolina, have the same period as that of the
proposed measure. Furthermore, to prevent the courts
of this state from becoming divorce mills, some restric-
tion might preferably be added to confine the remedy to
residents of Illinois on separations commencing within
this state.47
The proponents of the measure are probably wise in
refraining from dealing with the annoying problem of
47 The North Carolina statute requires that the plaintiff in the suit must
have resided in the state for the statutory period but is silent as to whether the
separation must have originated therein or could have commenced elsewhere.
Michie's Code, 1931, sec. 1659a. The residence requirement in Illinois is one
year except for marital misconduct occurring within the state. Ill. State Bar
Stats. (1935), Ch. 40, 1 3. On the general problem of migratory divorce, see
Joseph H. Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (New York: Baker,
Voorhies & Co., 1935), Vol. I, sec. 110.4, p. 472, et seq. By way of com-
parison see also article in Chicago Tribune, March 11, 1937, p. 1, col. 1, for
statistics and data on the appeal for the divorce business made by the states
of Nevada. Idaho, Florida, and Arkansas.
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permanent alimony after an absolute divorce, which, un-
der the guise of permanent separate maintenance, has
seemed so irksome a burden to some.48 The award of
permanent alimony has always been a matter for the dis-
cretion of the court under the Illinois Divorce Act4" and
presumably will continue in its discretion hereafter. To
say that none should be awarded where the divorce is
granted on this new ground would make marriage a mere
substitute for an illicit relationship with none of the
dangers or disgraces which attach to the latter. The com-
plaints of "gold-digging" are, therefore, likely to con-
tinue as long as some human beings insist on mating
without a thought of the future.
48 See note 5.
49 Ill. State l]ar Stats. (1935), Ch. 40, f 18. In Irwin v. Irwin, 105 Ky.
632, 49 S. W. 432 (1899), the court said: "It was not the intention of the
statute that a wife should be awarded alimony without reference to the ques-
tion as to whether she was at fault or not, where the divorce is granted
solely upon the ground of living separate and apart. The question of fault on
the part of the wife is always material in passing on the question of alimony
